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Schneider v. Sobo1444
(decided June 28, 1990)

Plaintiffs, who were school principals, department chairpersons
and other administrators who taught but were primarily
administrators, challenged the definition adopted by the
Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) under title 8 of the
New York Code Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) section
175.35(e)(1)(i), 445 which specifies the class of teachers eligible
for additional salary compensation pursuant to the Excellence In
Teaching Supplemental Salary Program (EIT) 446 as violative of
their equal protection rights under both the federal44 7 and state 448
constitutions. Using a rational relation test, the court held that the
"challenged regulation draws a legitimately discrete line, having
a fair and substantial relationship to the purposes of the EIT
legislation" 449
and
declared
section
175.35(e)(1)(i)
constitutional. EIT is a statewide program established in 1986
that uses state funds to improve the salaries of teachers employed
by local school districts. Its "goal was to promote the recruitment
and retention of quality teachers by providing supplementary
compensation to offset budget shortfalls experienced by local
school districts and Board of Cooperative Educational
Services." 450 The program's commissioner defined persons
eligible as "anyone who teaches and is compensated under
teachers' salary schedules.' 4 51 Plaintiffs, administrators who also
taught and were compensated under administrators' salary
schedules, brought suit to challenge their ineligibility under the
program. Plaintiffs' argued that the work they performed was
primarily the same as that of teachers who also have
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

76 N.Y.2d 309, 558 N.E.2d 23, 559 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1990).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 175.35(e)(1)(i) (1985).
N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 1900(15)(a), 3602(27)(a) (McKinney 1991).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
Sobol, 76 N.Y.2d at 314, 558 N.E.2d at 25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 223.

450. Id. at 313, 558 N.E.2d at 24, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 223.

451. Id.; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RErs. tit. 8, § 175.35(e)(1)(i)
(1985).
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administrative duties but who are not considered primarily
administrators. Therefore, plaintiffs argued, that the definition of
eligibility treats similarly functioning persons unequally,
rendering the disparate classification unconstitutional.
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of
the legislation was to relieve some of the economic burden of
underpaid educators. The court held that the regulation was not
irrational because teachers who primarily teach, but also have
administrative duties, are on lower salary schedules than full time
administrators who also teach. The court stated that the identified
state interest of enhancing the salaries of underpaid teachers
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. 452 The court reasoned
that "the selection of 'teachers salaries' compensation schedules
as the line of demarcation, allowing only some teaching
administrators to qualify, is not bereft of legislative justification;
rather, it is consistent with the words, history and intent of the
statute." 453 The court found that the disparate treatment was not
arbitrary, but rather, rationally related to the objectives of the
program.
The rational relation test is applied when determining the constitutionality of economic and social legislation under both the
federal and state constitutions. In Dandridge v. Williams, 454 the
United States Supreme Court established that:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." '4 55
Therefore, if the state can reasonably justify its legislation, the
statute will be upheld. In Dandridge, the Court upheld a

452. Sobol, 76 N.Y.2d at 315, 558 N.E.2d at 25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
453. Id. at 316, 558 N.E.2d at 26, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
454. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
455. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911)).
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Maryland economic assistance program. 45 6 The Court further
wrote that a state did not have to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is
enough that the state's action be rationally based and free from
457
invidious discrimination."
New York State has likewise adopted the rational basis standard
enunciated in Dandridge when determining whether legislation is
not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the New
York State Constitution. In Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center,458 the New York Court of Appeals referred to Dandridge
and found that the rational relation standard is accepted as the
proper test to be applied in the areas of economic and social
welfare legislation. 459
Therefore, in analyzing an equal protection claim under the
New York State Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals
utilizes the same principles as the United States Supreme Court
uses in analyzing an equal protection claim under the United
States Constitution. 460 To wit, social and economic legislation is
subject to the lowest form of judicial scrutiny, the rational
relation standard. Additionally, each court system condones a
"one step at a time" program for dealing with social and economic reform.
Golden v. Clark4 6 1
(decided October 23, 1990)

Plaintiffs, various city and political party officials, voters, and
political parties, challenged the constitutionality of New York
456. Id. at 487.
457. Id. at 486-87 (citations omitted).

458. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
459. Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
460. See, e.g., Diamond v. Cuomo, 70 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 514 N.E.2d
1356, 1357, 520 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (1987); Elmwood-Utica Houses, Inc., v.
Buffalo Sewer Auth., 65 N.Y.2d 489, 495, 482 N.E.2d 549, 552, 492
N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (1985); Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent
Children v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 364, 482 N.E.2d 1, 10, 492
N.Y.S.2d 522, 531 (1985).
461. 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990).
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